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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
opinions in the instant case is the more desirable one. In a free
society, it is necessary that there be a minimum of restraint on
means of communication, and that permissible restraints be
within limited areas. Although local governments should be able
to restrain those communications which are obscene or would
tend to incite unrest or riots, this power should be exercised in
such a manner as to impose only those restraints which are abso-
lutely necessary to accomplish the community purpose. In cen-
sorship and licensing regulations, there is a great opportunity
for the censor to apply his personal opinion as to what should be
allowed to be communicated. On the other hand, if local govern-
ments are obliged to restrain undesirable communications
through judicial remedies, then the community purpose is still
accomplished and at the same time the individual is deprived of
communicating freely only after an open hearing in a court of
law.20 If it is necessary to regulate forms of communication in
order to maintain proper standards in the community, it would
seem more desirable that standards be interpreted and restraints
be imposed by courts of law rather than by censors.
Frank F. Foil
CRIMINAL LAW- LIABILITY FOR PRIOR CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
The defendant loaned his car to a person who was intoxicated
and who subsequently became involved in an automobile accident
in which the driver of another car was killed. At the time of
the accident the defendant was not in the car, but he was tried
and convicted for the crime of involuntary manslaughter. The
defendant contended that he could not be convicted because he
was not a principal to the killing. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Michigan, held, reversed. The accountability of the
owner of the automobile must rest upon his complicity in the
misconduct involved. Where the criminal conduct was not
counseled by him, was not accomplished by another acting jointly
with him and did not occur in the attempted accomplishment
of some joint enterprise, the defendant cannot be held criminally
20. See Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957). The Supreme
Court upheld a law authorizing a public official to maintain action in court for an
injunction to prevent the sale or distribution of obscene matter possessed by any
person within the municipality with intent to sell or distribute the same on the
ground that the statute provided for a trial within one day after joinder of issue
with decision to be rendered within two days after the close of the trial.
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liable as a principal in respect to the criminal conduct. People
v. Marshall, 106 N.W.2d 842 (Mich. 1961).
Michigan defines involuntary manslaughter "as the killing
of another without malice and unintentionally while doing some
unlawful act not amounting to a felony nor naturally tending
to cause death or great bodily harm, or in negligently doing
some act lawful in itself."' As a general rule there are two
requirements that must be met before a defendant can be
convicted of the criminal negligence type of involuntary man-
slaughter: the defendant must be grossly negligent and his
negligent act must have been a substantial contribution to the
homicide. The requirements of gross negligence are met when
there is a disregard of the consequences which may ensue, and
an indifference to the rights of others equivalent to a criminal
intent.2 Thus gross negligence has been found when the actor
has knowledge of the highly dangerous nature of his actions or
knowledge of such facts as under the circumstances would dis-
close to a reasonable man the highly dangerous character of
his action.8 Most involuntary manslaughter statutes provide
1. MICH. STAT. § 28.553 (1954) : "Any person who shall commit the crime
of manslaughter shall be guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment in the
state prison, not more than fifteen (15) years or by fine of not more than seven
thousand five hundred (7,500) dollars, or both, at the discretion of the court ...
Involuntary manslaughter is the killing of another without malice and uninten-
tionally, but in doing some unlawful act not amounting to a felony nor naturally
tending to cause death or great bodily harm, or in negligently doing some act
lawful in itself, or by the negligent omission to perform a legal duty."
2. Id. § 28.553: "The term 'gross negligence' means something more than mere
negligence, such as wantonness and disregard of the consequences which may
ensue, and indifference to the rights of others that is equivalent to a criminal
intent."
The court in State v. Gooze, 14 N.J. Super. 277, 282, 81 A.2d 811, 814 (1951)
described criminal negligence by saying: "In this second class of cases the rule
is a broad one, as it regards as criminal negligence any act or omission done or
left undone, as the case may be, in reckless disregard of the life of safety of
another. Such negligence is often described as 'gross' negligence, the word 'gross'
in this collocation implying an indifference to consequences." (Citations omitted.)
See People v. Decina, 157 N.Y.S.2d 558, 138 N.E.2d 799 (1956) ; People v.
Eckert, 157 N.Y.S.2d 551, 138 N.E.2d 794 (1956).
3. People v. Eckert, 157 N.Y.S.2d 551, 556, 138 N.E.2d 794, 979 (1956):
"This conduct arises when the actor has knowledge of the highly dangerous
character of his actions or knowledge of such facts as under the circumstances
would disclose to a reasonable man the dangerous character of his action, and
despite this knowledge he so acts. That he does not view his conduct as dangerous
is of no consequence; his lack of realization of the danger involved may arise
from his abnormally reckless temperament or from unexpected favorable results
of previous conduct of the same sort . . . . To be dangerous his conduct must
involve a reasonable probability of serious bodily harm or death. This, of course,
turns on the particular circumstances of the case."
People v. Decina, 157 N.Y.S.2d 558, 564, 138 N.E.2d 799, 803 (1956) : "It is
sufficient, we have said, when his conduct manifests a 'disregard of the conse-
quences which may ensue from the act, and indifference to the rights of others.
No clearer definition, applicable to the hundreds of varying circumstances that
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that when a defendant has killed someone as a result of doing
an unlawful act he may be guilty of the crime even though no
criminal negligence is involved. 4 However, some states provide
that the unlawful act is merely indicative of gross negligence
so that a specific finding of gross negligence is necessary even
though the defendant is doing an unlawful act from which death
ensues." It is well settled that a driver can be prosecuted and
convicted of involuntary manslaughter if during the operation
of his car he is grossly negligent and death results therefrom.6
However, in order for a person to be held criminally negligent, it
is not necessary that the act occur at a time immediately prior
to the homicide.7
Only a person who is a party to the commission of a criminal
offense can be adjudged guilty of the offense." In order that
one may be guilty of criminal homicide the death must have
been caused by his own acts or by someone acting in concert
with him or in furtherance of a common object or purpose.0 A
may arise, can be given. Under a given state of facts, whether negligence is
culpable is a question of judgment.' "
4. See, e.g., MIcH. STAT. § 28.553 (1954) ; TEX. ANN. PEN. CODE arts. 1239,
1240 (Vernon, 1925) ; PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 56-64 (1957).
5. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 14:32 (1950), which provides: "Negligent homicide is
the killing of a human being by criminal negligence. The violation of a statute or
ordinance shall be considered only as presumptive evidence of such negligence."
6. Jones v. State, 33 Ala. App. 451, 34 So.2d 483 (1948) ; Trujillo v. People,
133 Colo. 186, 292 P.2d 980 (1956) ; Anderson v. State, 150 Neb. 116, 33 N.W.2d
362 (1948) ; Davis v. State, 194 Tenn. 308, 250 S.W.2d 534 (1952) ; PERKINS,
CRIMINAL LAW 61 (1957).
7. A few cases have held that a person who is likely to lose consciousness
when driving a car is criminally negligent when he gets into the car and drives
and not at the point at which he actually loses consciousness. The court in State
v. Gooze, 14 N.J. Super. 277, 286, 81 A.2d 811, 816 (1951) said: "In driving his
car alone on a through-state highway with knowledge that he might at any time
suddenly, without warning, lose consciousness or suffer a dizzy spell, and having
been cautioned not to drive alone, constituted an act of wantonness and a dis-
regard of the rights or safety of others."
People v. Decina, 157 N.Y.S.2d 558, 565, 138 N.E.2d 799, 803 (1953) said:
"With this knowledge, and without anyone accompanying him, he deliberately
took a chance by making a conscious choice of a course of action, in disregard
of the consequences which he knew might follow from his conscious act, and which
in this case did ensue. . . . To hold otherwise would be to say that a man may
freely indulge himself in liquor in the same hope that it will not affect his driv-
ing, and if it later develops that ensuing intoxication causes dangerous and reck-
less driving resulting in death, his unconsciousness or involuntariness at that time
would relieve him from prosecution under the statute. His awareness of a con-
dition which he knows may produce such consequences as here, and his disregard
of the consequences, renders him liable for culpable negligence, as the courts below
have properly held." Cf. People v. Eckert, 157 N.Y.2d 551, 138 N.E.2d 794 (1956).
8. Partridge v. State, 88 Ark. 267, 114 S.W. 215 (1908) ; State v. Miclau, 140
N.E.2d 596 (Ohio App. 1957) ; 14 AM. JUR., Criminal Law § 63 (1938).
9. 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law § 79 (1940) : "To constitute one a party to an
offense it has been held to be essential that he be concerned in its commission in
some affirmative manner, as by actual commission of the crime or by aiding and
abetting in its commission." See United States v. Dellaro, 99 F.2d 781 (2d Cir.
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person can be held for the misconduct of one over whom he exer-
cised control.' 0 Thus a person who aids and abets in the com-
mission of the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor may be tried and convicted
as a principal to the crime of involuntary manslaughter if some-
one is killed as a result of criminal negligence, although the
actual driving was done by another person." As yet, however,
this rule has been applied only in the situation where the person
loaning the vehicle to one under the influence of alcohol is ac-
tually present in the car, since there is no possibility of control
otherwise. In fact, in a case where the defendant permitted
another to use his automobile, which the defendant knew to be
in a dangerous and defective condition, the court reversed the
conviction of manslaughter arising from an accident in which
the borrower struck and killed a pedestrian. The rationale was
that there was no causal connection between the killing and
the negligence of the owner.' 2 However, in a case where the
defendant-owner of a car was sitting next to the driver, per-
mitted him to drive negligently, and this resulted in a fatal
accident, the court said, "if the killing was the proximate cause
of the criminally negligent act of the defendant he would be
guilty of negligent homicide and the mere fact that some other
cause operated with the negligence of the defendant to produce
the injury does not relieve the defendant from liability.'"'5
1938) ; Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085 (1.905) ; Smith v.
State, 92 P.2d 582 (Okla. Crim. App. 1939) ; Carrico v. State, 16 Okla. Crim. 118,
180 Pac. 870 (1919) ; 14 AM. JuR., Criminal Law § 63 (1938).
10. 14 AM. JuE., Criminal Law § 63 (1938). See Elkhorn Mining Corp. v.
Commonwealth, 173 Ky. 417, 191 S.W. 256 (1917) ; Blocker v. Commonwealth,
153 Ky. 304, 155 S.W. 723 (1913).
11. Story v. United States, 16 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1926) ; Ez parte Liotard,
47 Nev. 169, 217 Pac. 960 (1923) ; State v. Trott, 190 N.C. 674, 130 S.E. 627
(1925) ; Eager v. State, 325 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. 1959) ; Brewer v. State, 143
S.W.2d 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 1940); James v. Commonwealth, 178 Va. 34, 16
S.E.2d 296 (1941); 3 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 62 (1957)
("One, who, being in the possession of an auto in the hands of an intoxicated
person sits with the latter and permits him to operate the vehicle without protest
may be convicted of the offense provided he knew of the condition of the one he
let drive.").
12. People v. Rauch, 299 N.Y. Supp. 155 (1937).
13. State v. Walker, 204 Ore. 69, 80, 282 P.2d 344, 346 (1955). Although the
court did not consider what might be a proximate cause, the language was broad
enough so that the prior negligence of the defendant in loaning his car to an in-
toxicated person who committed involuntary manslaughter might be considered
the proximate cause. The court said: "There may be more than one proximate
cause of an accident, if each of the causes asserted can be seen to have been an
efficient one, without which the injury resulting would not have been sustained.
If -the negligent acts of two or more persons concur in contributing to an accident,
the injured person may hold them jointly and severally liable. Where concurrence
in causes is charged, the test is, simply, could the accident have happened without
their cooperation? 'Guilty of responsible concurrence in causing an injury involves
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The definition of negligent homicide in the Louisiana Crim-
inal Code is very similar to the Michigan involuntary man-
slaughter statute, in that both are concerned with death resulting
from criminal negligence. 14 However, in Louisiana the violation
of a statute or ordinance is only presumptive evidence of crim-
inal negligence, whereas in Michigan the violation of a statute
or ordinance automatically makes the defendant guilty of in-
voluntary manslaughter without finding criminal negligence if
he is a party to the crime. The Louisiana Criminal Code also
provides that a person is a principal whenever he is "concerned
in the commission of a crime, whether he is present or absent,
and whether he directly commits the act constituting the offense,
aids and abets in its commission, or directly or indirectly coun-
sels or procures another to commit the crime."'15 It has been
held in Louisiana that if a person driving a car kills someone
as a result of operating the car in a grossly negligent manner
he can be found guilty of negligent homicide. 16 However, there
are no reported Louisiana cases dealing with the situation where
the defendant was not driving.
Whether or not the prior negligence of lending an automobile
to an intoxicated person will enable the state to convict the
defendant of involuntary manslaughter has been settled for the
present in the State of Michigan by the instant decision. The
court said: "It is axiomatic that criminal guilt under our law
is personal fault. It is of the very essence of our deep-rooted
notions of criminal liability that guilt be personal and individual.
A person cannot be held a principal with respect to a fatal
accident where the killing was not counselled by him, accom-
the idea of two or more active agencies cooperating to produce it; either of which
must be an efficient cause, without the operation of which the accident would
not have happened. * * * In every such case, the question is what was the proxi-
mate cause of the concurrence and, if concurrence in negligence is claimed, were
the acts or omissions of the parties so closely related and co-operative as to make
either a probable and an efficient cause? Could it be said of each cause that
without its operation the accident would not have happened?' The mere fact that
some other cause operated with the negligence of the defendant to produce the
injury complained of does not relieve the defendant from liability. If the damage
is caused by the concurring force of the defendant's negligence and some other
cause for which he is not responsible, whether such other cause be of human
origin or act of God, defendant is nevertheless responsible if his negligence is
one of the proximate causes of the damage."
14. LA. R.S. 14:32 (1950), note 5 8upra.
15. Id. 14:24: "All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether
present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the
offense, aid and abet its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure
another to commit the crime, are principals."
16. State v. Venzant, 200 La. 301, 7 So.2d 917 (1942) ; State v. Porter, 176
La. 673, 146 So. 465 (1933) ; State v. Wilbanks, 168 La. 861, 123 So. 600 (1929).
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plished by another acting jointly with him, nor occurring in
the attempted achievement of some common enterprise. It is a
basic proposition in a constitutional society that crimes should
be defined in advance, and not after action has been taken." By
declaring that criminal liability should be personal and indi-
vidual the court decided that the defendant, in order to be con-
victed of involuntary manslaughter, must collaborate in the
homicide.
Under a strict interpretation of the Michigan definition of
principal, it would appear that the court in the instant case was
correct in reversing the conviction because of a finding that
the defendant was not a principal. However, it is submitted
that although no case has been found upholding a conviction in
a situation similar to that of the instant case, it appears that
conviction in other states should be possible. If the defendant
was criminally negligent in lending the car to a known drunk,
his act was a cause of the negligent slaying. One court has
stated that "the mere fact that some other cause operated with
the negligence of the defendant to produce the injury does not
relieve the defendant from liability."'17 Although in that case
the defendant was in the car, it would seem that this language
could include the negligence of a person who lends his car to
another when he knows that the other is intoxicated or in such
condition that he may cause death or serious injury. By the very
act of lending his car when he knows that the driver, while in
such condition, may cause death or serious injury to another he
has committed what could be found to be a grossly negligent
act. As for Louisiana, it would seem that the defendant could
be found a co-principal. The Louisiana Criminal Code defines
principals as "all persons concerned with the commission of a
crime, whether present or absent.""' In this situation, the de-
fendant is certainly concerned with the death, for he has put
a known dangerous force in motion and the very sort of injury
expectable, i.e., a traffic accident, has occurred. It is hoped that
the Louisiana courts will adopt this position when the issue is
presented.
Roland C. Kizer, Jr.
17. State v. Walker, 204 Ore. 69, 81, 282 P.2d 344, 346 (1955).
18. LA. R.S. 14:24 (1950).
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